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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-4055 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE, 
                     Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cr-00416) 
District Judge: Hon. R. Barclay Surrick  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, ROTH, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: August 9, 2019) 
______________  
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Defendant John Doe pled guilty to one count of sex trafficking of a minor. The 
District Court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised 
release, subject to certain special conditions. 
Defendant now appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred by 
imposing a sentence that was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the 
following reasons, we reject Defendant’s arguments and will affirm. 
I.1 
For approximately five months, 43-year-old Defendant recruited females into 
prostitution by posting advertisements on the now-defunct website www.backpage.com 
(“Backpage”). One of the females recruited by Defendant was a 16-year-old runaway 
from Rhode Island. In March 2015, after interacting with the underage female online, 
Defendant drove from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Rhode Island to pick her up. He then 
drove the minor from Rhode Island to a motel in New Jersey. 
Thereafter, Defendant posted an advertisement on Backpage offering the minor’s 
prostitution services. The advertisement included photographs of the minor and 
Defendant’s phone number. Based on that advertisement, clients would contact 
Defendant, who would then arrange the sexual encounters between the minor and the 
clients. 
 The minor worked as a prostitute for Defendant for approximately two weeks. 
During that time, she had sex in exchange for money at different locations including the 
                                                 
1 These undisputed facts are contained in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
provided by the parties, dated July 15, 2016.  
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motel, another hotel, and a client’s residence. In addition to arranging the minor’s sexual 
encounters with clients, Defendant transported the minor to and from those encounters, 
set the fees for those encounters, and kept a percentage of the minor’s earnings. 
II. 
In March 2016, Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to one count of sex 
trafficking of a minor,2 a crime which carries a mandatory minimum ten-year prison 
term3 and a mandatory minimum five-year supervised release term.4 After the District 
Court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea, the United States Probation Office prepared a 
PSR. The PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ 
imprisonment. 
At sentencing, the Government requested a 180-month prison term, while 
Defendant sought a downward variance, asking for a sentence “at or near” the 120-month 
mandatory minimum prison term.5 The District Court denied the parties’ requests, 
adopted an updated PSR without change,6 and sentenced Defendant to 168 months’ 
imprisonment, the lowest end of the Guidelines range. The Court also imposed the 
                                                 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 
3 Id. § 1591(b)(2). 
4 Id. § 3583(k). 
5 JA 87. 
6 The parties did not provide us with a copy of the updated PSR. We note that the 
sentencing transcript reflects that neither the Government nor Defendant objected to the 
updated PSR. Moreover, both the transcript and the District Court’s Statement of Reasons 
indicate that the updated PSR calculated the same Guidelines range as the initial PSR.  
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mandatory minimum five-year term of supervised release, subject to several special 
conditions.7  
III.8 
Generally, we review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 
sentence for abuse of discretion.9 However, given that Defendant failed to object to the 
procedural reasonableness of his sentence at sentencing, we review his procedural claims 
for plain error.10 “The plain error test requires (1) an error; (2) that is clear or obvious[;] 
and (3) affected the defendant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he or 
she must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.”11 If those three conditions are satisfied, we will 
exercise our discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”12  
IV. 
A. Procedural Reasonableness 
On appeal, Defendant raises three procedural arguments, all of which are 
meritless.13 As explained below, the District Court committed no procedural errors. 
                                                 
7 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). 
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
9 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
10 United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
11 United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
12 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 We will not review the merits of Defendant’s claim that the District Court committed 
procedural error by applying the sentencing enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B) of the 
 5 
1. District Court’s reliance on bare arrest record 
First, Defendant asserts that the Court plainly erred by relying on his “bare arrest 
record” to determine his sentence. A bare arrest record “describes the reference to the 
mere fact of an arrest—i.e. the date, charge, jurisdiction and disposition—without 
corresponding information about the underlying facts or circumstances regarding the 
defendant’s conduct that led to the arrest.”14 We have held that a District Court cannot 
rely on a “bare arrest record” in sentencing a defendant.15 However, it may consider “the 
underlying conduct where reliable evidence of that conduct is proffered or where the PSR 
adequately details the underlying facts without objection from the defendant.”16  
Here, at sentencing, in assessing Defendant’s background, the District Court made 
a single reference to the underlying conduct that led to Defendant’s October 2014 arrest 
in New Jersey for stalking, coercion, and criminal trespass. It did so in the context of 
acknowledging that such conduct, along with the conduct underlying Defendant’s 
Pennsylvania convictions for harassment and disorderly conduct, created concerns that 
Defendant could pose a danger to the community.17 Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, 
the Court did not commit error, let alone plain error. Rather, in sentencing Defendant, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
Guidelines. Defendant waived his right to challenge that enhancement. See United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). 
14 United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2012). 
15 See United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 274 (3d Cir. 2009). 
16 Berry, 553 F.3d at 284. 
17 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2) (requiring sentencing courts to consider, inter alia, the 
history and characteristics of a defendant, and the need for the sentence imposed to 
protect the public). 
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properly mentioned and considered the underlying facts of Defendant’s arrest as 
described in the uncontested PSR.18  
2. District Court’s reliance on clearly erroneous facts 
Second, Defendant argues that the District Court plainly erred by relying on 
clearly erroneous facts related to his criminal history.19 According to Defendant, the 
Government incorrectly stated that Defendant had committed “very serious felonies”20 
when in fact he had been convicted of Pennsylvania summary offenses.21 The District 
Court, says Defendant, committed procedural error by relying on the Government’s 
mischaracterization of those convictions in selecting Defendant’s sentence.22 We 
disagree. The record indicates no such reliance. 
Here, the PSR provided to us indicates that Defendant has prior convictions under 
Pennsylvania law for harassment and disorderly conduct, and was sentenced to one year 
                                                 
18 As correctly noted by Defendant, the PSR filed in our Court does not include 
information about the underlying facts or circumstances of the arrest. See PSR ¶ 41 
(stating that “[d]etails of this open matter have been requested,” and “will be included in 
the final report”). Although we would have preferred that counsel provide a copy of the 
final undisputed PSR, its absence from our docket does not affect our analysis of this 
issue.  
19 A factual finding “is clearly erroneous when[,] although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
20 JA 92–93. 
21 Under Pennsylvania law, a summary offense is an offense that is statutorily designated 
as such, or one that carries a maximum sentence of ninety days’ imprisonment. 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 106(c).  
22 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (describing “selecting a sentence 
based on clearly erroneous facts” as a “significant procedural error”). 
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of probation.23 In Pennsylvania, harassment and disorderly conduct can be graded as 
summary offenses.24 However, the PSR does not specify the grading of Defendant’s 
convictions. 
At sentencing, defense counsel referenced Defendant’s criminal history in general 
terms. He stated that Defendant “really has no record to speak of” and had “a couple [of] 
minor brushes with the law.”25 In response to those statements, the Government 
explained that it disagreed with the assertion that “[D]efendant’s criminal history is not 
much to mention.”26 It maintained that Defendant “repeatedly engaged in very serious 
criminal conduct . . . very serious felonies involving very grave impact on the persons 
who were victimized.”27  
On appeal, it is undisputed that Defendant was convicted of summary offenses; 
therefore, his criminal history does not include felony convictions.28 The Government 
urges us to interpret its comments as related to “the nature of [Defendant]’s recent course 
                                                 
23 Defendant was sentenced to six months of probation on each count. The probationary 
term for the harassment conviction was ordered to run consecutively to the probationary 
term for disorderly conduct.  
24 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2709(c)(1) (stating that harassment qualifies as a summary 
offense if it is charged under one of the three subsections related to physical contact); Id. 
§ 5503(b) (stating that disorderly conduct is “a misdemeanor of the third degree if the 
intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists 
in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise disorderly 
conduct is a summary offense.”). 
25 JA 85. 
26 Id. at 92. 
27 Id. at 92–93 (emphasis added). 
28 In support of his claim that his convictions were for summary offenses, Defendant cites 
to publicly available state court docket sheets. The Government concedes that 
Defendant’s criminal history does not include felony convictions.  
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of conduct, rather than the classification of his prior conviction and his other criminal 
conduct,”29 while Defendant asserts that the comments related to his criminal history.  
Taking judicial notice of the fact that Defendant was convicted of summary 
offenses,30 and even assuming that the Government’s statements qualify as stating clearly 
erroneous facts about Defendant’s criminal history, Defendant’s argument nevertheless 
fails. There is no evidence that in sentencing Defendant, the District Court relied on the 
erroneous belief that Defendant had a criminal history including two felonies. Rather, the 
Court properly relied on the underlying facts of the offenses from the uncontested PSR, 
including the fact that Defendant “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, caused bodily 
injury” to his 10-year-old autistic son “by striking him with a closed fist.”31 
Defendant is unable to show any error. The Court correctly recognized that 
Defendant did not have a “significant criminal record” but that the record was 
nevertheless “concerning” given the underlying facts.32 
3. District Court’s reliance on unsubstantiated mental-health-related 
concerns 
 
Third, and finally, Defendant argues that the District Court improperly diagnosed 
him with mental health problems, and based his sentence on “unsubstantiated concerns” 
about his mental health.33 This claim is likewise without merit.  
                                                 
29 Gov’t. Br. 30. 
30 See In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205–06 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Judicial 
notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding, including on appeal, as long as it is 
not unfair to a party to do so and does not undermine the trial court’s factfinding 
authority.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
31 PSR ¶ 37. See id. at ¶¶ 48–49. 
32 JA 99. 
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At sentencing, after expressing concern about the underlying facts of Defendant’s 
instant offense and prior convictions, the District Court concluded that mental health 
treatment should be part of Defendant’s sentence. In doing so, the Court stated:  
[i]t’s clear to me that the defendant has significant problems. He has mental 
health problems, that’s apparent. He has problems of a psychosexual 
nature. He needs treatment and I’m going to provide treatment for him as 
part of this sentence.34  
 
It then informed Defendant that it would be “very strongly” recommending to the Bureau 
of Prisons that Defendant “go to an institution in the federal system that can deal with his 
mental health and psychosexual problems.”35  
The Court further explained that placing Defendant in such an institution serves 
the twofold purpose of providing Defendant with the treatment that he needs and 
protecting society upon Defendant’s release from prison. Defense counsel did not object 
to these statements. 
In our view, the Court’s comments do not render the sentence procedurally 
unreasonable. There is ample support in the record for the Court’s decision 
recommending that Defendant be imprisoned in an institution where he could be 
evaluated and receive treatment as needed. The record reflects that Defendant engaged in 
a series of troubling events starting in September 2014 when he was arrested in 
Pennsylvania for striking his 10-year-old autistic son with a closed fist. Nearly one month 
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Def. Br. 16. 
34 JA 100. 
35 Id. at 100–01. Accordingly, in the judgment of sentence, the Court “strongly 
recommended” to the Bureau of Prisons “that Defendant be designated to an institution 
where Defendant will receive a comprehensive psycho-sexual evaluation and mental 
health and psycho-sexual treatment.” Id. at 3. 
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after that arrest, Defendant was arrested in New Jersey for stalking an 18-year-old 
female, coercion, and criminal trespass. Thereafter, in March 2015, while on probation 
for the Pennsylvania summary offenses, he committed the instant offense of sex 
trafficking of a minor. 
Given Defendant’s lack of interaction with the criminal justice system until 2014 
when he was forty-two years old, the close temporal relationship between the offenses, 
and the underlying facts of the offenses, the Court did not err in considering Defendant’s 
mental health needs and determining that mental health treatment should be part of 
Defendant’s sentence.  
For the same reasons, we are also unpersuaded by Defendant’s claim that the 
Court had no basis for imposing mental health evaluation and treatment as a special 
condition of supervised release.36 Defendant’s sentence is therefore procedurally 
reasonable. 
B. Substantive Reasonableness 
Next, Defendant argues that his 168-month prison sentence was greater than  
necessary to further the goals of sentencing.37 This argument is unavailing.  
Here, after carefully considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), the District Court rejected Defendant’s request for a downward variance and 
                                                 
36 The judgment states: “[D]efendant shall participate in a psycho-sexual and mental 
health program for evaluation and/or treatment and abide by the rules of any such 
program until satisfactorily discharged.” Id. at 6. 
37 Defendant also maintains that the Court’s procedural errors rendered his sentence 
substantively unreasonable. However, given our conclusion that the Court did not commit 
any of those errors, we will not discuss them in the context of assessing the substantive 
reasonableness of Defendant’s sentence. 
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concluded that a sentence “at the very bottom” of the Guidelines range was appropriate.38 
Based on the facts of the underlying sex-trafficking-of-a-minor offense as well as 
Defendant’s history and characteristics, we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence.”39 Defendant’s sentence is thus 
substantively reasonable. 
IV. 
The sentence imposed by the District Court is neither procedurally nor 
substantively unreasonable. We will therefore affirm the judgment of sentence. 
                                                 
38 JA 100. 
39 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
